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Abstract: We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers’
model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the
development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our
knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate,
we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay
betweenprimitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
Carruthers makes a good case that self-awareness of propositional
attitudes is an interpretational process, and does not involve direct
introspective access. He also argues that mindreading and meta-
cognition rely on one cognitive mechanism; however, in this
case we are less persuaded by the evidence which hinges on Car-
ruthers’ reading of well-rehearsed data from autism and schizo-
phrenia. We think that these two predictions have distinct bases
and it is at least conceivable that there are two dissociable inter-
pretativemeta-representational systems capable of confabulation:
one self-directed, one other-directed. Thus, the argument in
favour of model 4, over, say, a version of model 1 without a
strong commitment to non-interpretative access to self-states, is
based purely on parsimony. Our intention is not to defend such
a two-system model, but rather to point out that even if one
accepts that metacognition involves interpretation, mindreading
and metacognition may still be dissociable. Furthermore, Car-
ruthers pays little attention to the differences between input chan-
nels associated with first- and third-person mindreading and the
surely distinct mechanisms (arguably within the mindreading
system) that translate them into attitude-interpretations. As a
result, we worry that Carruthers may end up with a rather impo-
verished model that struggles to do justice to the broader pheno-
type of first- and third-person mindreading, its development, and
the ways in which it may go awry in psychopathology.
Carruthers’ reading of developmental evidence is restricted to
the standard strategy of comparing children’s performance across
false-belief tasks. These are inherently conservative tests of
mindreading ability, as false-belief-attribution is neither a
common nor a particularly reliable function of the mindreading
system (Birch & Bloom 2007; Keysar et al. 2003). Clearly,
there are earlier and more common abilities central to develop-
ment of third-person propositional-attitude mindreading – for
example, referential understanding of gazes (Brooks & Meltzoff
2002; Senju et al. 2008) or pretense. However Carruthers does
not discuss development of the mechanism that is central to his
model. He also overlooks evidence that the tendency to engage
in pretence has no primacy over the ability to understand pre-
tence in others (Leslie 1987; Onishi et al. 2007).
There are other developmental areas potentially useful to
Carruthers’ argument. Several socio-constructivist accounts
(e.g., Fonagy et al. 2002; 2007) attempt to describe the develop-
mental mechanisms by which early social-cognitive competences,
expressed especially in early interactions with the attachment
figure (Sharp & Fonagy 2008), give rise to metacognitive
awareness. Arguably, the most advanced of these theories is the
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social-biofeedback model proposed by Gergely and Watson (1996;
1999; Fonagy et al. 2002; Gergely & Unoka 2008). Currently, this
model assumes that in repetitive episodes of (mostly) nonverbal
communication (Csibra & Gergely 2006) mothers provide marked
emotional “mirroring” displays which are highly (but inevitably
imperfectly) contingent on the emotional displays of the infant.
By doing so, mothers provide specific forms of biofeedback, allow-
ing infants to parse their affective experience, form separate
categories of their affective states, and form associations between
these categories and their developing knowledge of the causal
roles of emotions in other people’s behaviour.
It is important to note that socio-constructivist theory is an
essential complement to Carruthers’ model 4, bridging a poten-
tially fatal gap in his argument. People do attribute propositional
emotional states to the self, and it seems reasonable to assume
that their actual emotional states (propositional or not) play a
role in generating such attributions. Carruthers’ current proposal
under-specifies how the mindreading system, which evolved
for the purpose of interpreting others’ behaviour, comes to be
capable of interpreting primary somatic data specific to cat-
egories of affective states and of attributing them to the self.
Furthermore, according to Carruthers, when the mindreading
system does its standard job of third-person mental-state attribu-
tion, this sort of data “play little or no role” (target article, sect. 2,
para. 8). Presumably, they can contribute, for example, by biasing
the outcome of the mindreading processes (like when negative
affect leads one to attribute malicious rather than friendly
intentions). However, in first-person attributions, their function
is quite different. They are the main source of input, providing
the mindreading system with cues on the basis of which it
can recognize current emotional attitude-states. The social-
biofeedback model assumes that the mindreading system is not
readily capable of doing this job and spells out the mechanism
facilitating development of this ability. Putting it in terms of Car-
ruthers’ model 4: it explains how primary intra- and propriocep-
tive stimulation gains attentional focus to become globally
accessible and how the mindreading system becomes able to
win competition for these data.
Research on borderline personality disorder further illumi-
nates the value of the socio-constructivist model (Fonagy &
Bateman 2008). The primary deficit in borderline personality dis-
order (BPD) is often assumed to be a deficit in affect self-
regulation (e.g., Linehan 1993; Schmideberg 1947; Siever et al.
2002). We have evidence of structural and functional deficits in
brain areas of patients with BPD normally considered central
in affect regulation (Putnam & Silk 2005). Accumulating empiri-
cal evidence suggests that patients with BPD have characteristic
limitations in their self-reflective (metacognitive) capacities
(Diamond et al. 2003; Fonagy et al. 1996; Levy et al. 2006) that
compromise their ability to represent their own subjective
experience (Fonagy & Bateman 2007). There is less evidence
for a primary deficit of mindreading (Choi-Kain & Gunderson
2008). Evidence from longitudinal investigations suggests that
neglect of a child’s emotional responses (the absence of mirroring
interactions) may be critical in the aetiology of BPD (Lyons-Ruth
et al. 2005), more so even than frank maltreatment (Johnson et al.
2006). We think that the BPD model may become an important
source of new data that could illuminate relationships between
mindreading and self-awareness and their developmental antece-
dents. We suggest that children who experience adverse rearing
conditions may be at risk of developing compromised second-
order representations of self-states because they are not afforded
the opportunity to create the necessary mappings between the
emerging causal representations of emotional states in others
and emerging distinct emotional self-states.
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